Germany and the Arab World: Finding a New Cooperation Model in Times of Growing Escalation

1. Germany’s balancing act: A transitional period in foreign policymaking

Indeed, German foreign policy finds itself in a general dilemma: on the one hand, it propagates a value-based approach and defines universal human rights as the “most important shield for the dignity of the individual”, as stated in the coalition agreement. For Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock, “values and interests are not contradictory”, but Germany must take a “clear stance” in a changing world. This approach can also be found in the strategic policy papers on feminist foreign and , which were presented jointly by the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development on February 1, 2023. Both strategies are focusing on inclusion, participation, gender equality, and a more holistic understanding of security including climate and health security and the goal to reduce power inequalities in the form of patriarchy, racism, sexism, ableism, or classism. In addition to both strategies, Germany’s first national security strategy adopted in June 2023 also presents an integrated definition of security. In times of a multipolar world order and growing international crises, Germany has to act in a robust, resilient, and sustainable manner by defending the international order. Trade relations need to be diversified and society prepared for growing challenges such as systemic rivalries, pandemics, or climate change. From a governmental perspective, the strategy serves as a “compass” for such purposes, writes Chancellor Olaf Scholz in his foreword, while Baerbock names the security of freedom as a priority goal. Germany finds itself in a period of fundamental “watershed” or “turning point” () as Chancellor Scholz described it after the start of the war against Ukraine in February 2022. Old certainties have crumbled since then and Germany must find its position in a new world order.

2. How to deal with the Middle East: A lack of comprehensive strategy

Despite such efforts to conceptualize a strategic foreign policymaking in the German decision-making, the Arab world and in particular the Gulf region are not mentioned in detail. So far, Germany lacks a clear and credible vision for its position in the world and in particular in the Near and Middle East. In foreign policymaking circles, such debate is already ongoing, but a comprehensive result has not been achieved yet. This fact shows once again that Germany has neglected the geopolitical relevance of the Arab world in its foreign policy concept in recent years. A brief look at the history of German foreign policy since its reunification in 1990 shows that there are more complex reasons behind this lack of prioritization than just ignorance and disinterest: In line with the United States, the transatlantic partnership dominated Germany’s foreign and security policy, while integration into the European Union (EU) became the second pillar of German foreign policy. Multilateralism, Europe, and the transatlantic partnership served as key drivers for German foreign policy action in recent decades and continues to do so. As a consequence, Germany focused on soft power and foreign cultural and development cooperation rather than on an autonomous policy approach towards the Middle East. It wanted to be perceived in the world as a moral actor – as a “good German” – and not as an assertive superpower after the traumatic experiences under Nazi Germany: The moral behaviour became the raison d’être of the peace and civil power Germany.

However, this traditional approach has been put to the test more than ever in the face of a fundamental erosion of the old global order and in light of the war in Gaza. Therefore, it becomes even more urgent for Germany to develop a comprehensive strategy that takes into account its special relationship with Israel and thus also promotes a multidimensional discussion about the definition of “Staatsräson” as its concrete meaning and implications remain vague. Additionally, Germany, as a profound defender of international rule of law, needs to take humanitarian and political responsibility towards the people in Gaza. Finally, the Arab world has emerged as a relevant region for Germany’s interest in particular in geostrategic, energy-related, and economic terms. Demands that Germany should fulfill an “anchor function” in foreign policy have been expressed even before October 7^th from different angles, but have become even more urgent in recent months. However, expertise, financial capacities, and human resources are oftentimes lacking in German foreign policymaking which also limits a pro-active, constructive, and comprehensive engagement in the Arab world. Despite the government’s ambition to better streamline and design foreign policy, over-bloated administrative processes, lack of personnel in ministries, cultural entities, academic institutions and security organizations, as well as existing competition among the different ministries and departments prevent decision-making from implementing efficient and long-term policy actions.

3. Mutual interest in de-escalation: The need for enhanced German-Arab cooperation

In light of the current escalation in the Near and Middle East, such shortcomings have been put in the international spotlight and thus driving a further wedge between Germany and the Arab world. As a consequence, this atmosphere of alienation and mistrust does not contribute to a solution for the manifold conflicts in the region, and also does not serve the multiple security, economic, and political interests in Germany and the Arab world. In light of growing regional tensions and further escalation between Israel and Iran, Germany and its Arab partners should therefore engage in enhanced communication and dialogue as both sides are seriously interested in de-escalation. Indeed, regular communication is taking place on high-ranking political levels as indicated by the official trips of Chancellor Olaf Scholz, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and other German politicians to the region and serious efforts to promote “crisis diplomacy” on a multilateral level. Here, Germany and its partners in the Arab world are discussing conflict solutions and concrete actions such as substantial aid provision to Gaza or the implementation of a ceasefire. Communication channels on a political, cultural, and economic level remain open due to well-established networks and trustworthy partnerships between Germany and its counterparts in the Arab world. Despite a decline in mutual trust and diverging positions on the regional crises, both are interested to remain in close dialogue and find ways for conflict resolution and diplomatic efforts.

On an economic level, business interests will continue to drive Germany’s cooperation with the region. Traditionally, economic and energy policy interests have mainly dominated German-Gulf Arab relations in particular in light of the growing need for Germany’s energy diversification since the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine. Such appetite in enhanced cooperation is likely to continue and thus could create more platforms for confidence-building measures. On the Arab side, Germany has lost in attraction as a promising economic heavyweight in recent years but still features prominently as a trade and investment partner. This is particularly the case for the Arab Gulf monarchies: In 2021, the total value of imports and exports between Germany and the Gulf monarchies amounted to EUR 18.9 billion, with German exports contributing EUR 13 billion to the trade balance. With a volume of EUR 8 billion, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are Germany’s most important trading partner in the Gulf, followed by Saudi Arabia with EUR 6.6 billion. In 2019, prior to the World Cup, Germany ranked as Qatar’s fifth most important trading partner behind the US and China and exported goods worth EUR 1.5 billion. In the construction and machinery sectors as well as in engineering and services, the World Cup provided German companies excellent opportunities to enter the market. A total of 150 German companies were active locally in 2021.

Despite the Gulf countries’ focus on Asian partners and their rhetorical and political alienation from Europe, European companies still feature prominently in their partnership portfolio

Qatar, on the other hand, has invested more than EUR 25 billion in German companies. Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia are undergoing a fundamental socio-economic transformation and are in dire need for foreign direct investment (FDI), trade partnerships, closer cooperation in know-how transfer and educational exchange in order to diversify their rentier economy away from oil and gas and create jobs for the young generations. Despite their increasing focus on Asian partners such as China, Korea and Japan and their rhetorical and political alienation from Europe, European companies such as from Germany still feature prominently in their partnership portfolio. Germany, in turn, has entered closer cooperation models with energy-rich Gulf states since the beginning of the Russian war on Ukraine in order to diversify its traditional energy mix. Before the war, Germany obtained 55% of its gas supplies from Russia, which in turn created a highly problematic political dependency on Moscow. As part of the national energy transition, Germany is aiming to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 65% by 2030 increase the share of renewable energies in electricity generation to 80% and achieve . Hydrogen is thus set to become a key component of the German energy mix. Back in June 2020, the then German government launched the National Hydrogen Strategy, which provides a framework for hydrogen-based energy generation and aims to secure the necessary imports. Gulf states such as Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE aim at establishing themselves as regional hydrogen champions which also enhanced potential for German-Gulf energy cooperation: In March 2021, Germany and Saudi Arabia signed the German-Saudi Energy Dialogue to promote bilateral cooperation in the production and transportation of hydrogen, and in February 2022, Germany opened an “Office for Hydrogen Diplomacy” in the Saudi capital Riyadh in cooperation with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH.  Similar partnership models also exist with Qatar, Oman and the UAE. The growing German interest in energy cooperation with the Gulf states was symbolized by the visit of Robert Habeck, Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Action, to the UAE and Qatar in March 2022. During Chancellor Scholz’s first trip to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Qatar in September 2022, the focus was also on energy security and economic cooperation. During this time, tough negotiations took place between Qatar and Germany before an agreement was reached: In September 2022, Doha and Berlin agreed on a more comprehensive energy partnership, under which Germany is to purchase liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the state-owned company Qatar Energy via the US company ConocoPhillips for 15 years from 2026.

4. Need for Enhanced Dialogue: Expectation Management, Respect, and Empathy

Despite such ongoing political dialogue and economic and energy cooperation, a coherent German strategy on its Near and Middle East policy is lacking. Instead of just reacting to current crises, Germany is expected to take a clear and credible position on the situation in the MENA (Middle East North Africa) region. More than ever, Germany thus needs an open, self-reflective and self-critical discussion that reconceptualizes its own policy in the Near and Middle East. Certainly, the special relationship with Israel will be at the heart of this approach, but the humanitarian responsibility for the victims of the Gaza war and the interest in long-term regional stability and de-escalation must not be neglected. It is therefore necessary to better align values and interests rather than considering them as opposites. Germany has lost a great deal of trust in the region and should try to restore it. To this end, it is important to communicate its own position more clearly by pointing out the complicated situation in which Germany finds itself. The ‘Zeitenwende’ is a time- and resource-consuming process that not only needs more financial, logistical, military, and human capacities, but also a change in mental and strategic thinking.

In times of growing lack of trust, platforms for political, social, and public communication need to be supported in order to provide safe spaces for open dialogue and critical exchange. Here, not only economy and diplomacy but also civil society initiatives, NGOs, development cooperation players, journalists, and media activists have to be included in order to promote open and critical discussions. Against this backdrop, experts in dialogue and mediation as well as conflict resolution initiatives, and think tanks should be encouraged to establish more platforms and projects aiming at bringing people from Germany and the Near and Middle East region together. In this regard, more projects to engage partners both from Germany (and other European countries) and Arab countries are needed to overcome existing stereotypes and work on a common understanding. Existing initiatives and institutions have been criticized in light of the Gaza war. Against this backdrop, experts from academia and research, business, non-profit organizations, culture and arts, media, migration policies and development cooperation, sports, tourism, and entertainment need to discuss topics of mutual interest in order to identify chances for closer cooperation on an interdisciplinary level. Certainly, the current polarization creates tensions and a lack of understanding on both sides but learning from and listening to each other seems more important than ever before. So far, many workshops, conferences, or discussion forums still take place with a small group of the already established “usual suspects” and “opinion shapers” from research, policy advice, politics, and the media, while newcomers and junior talents only gain access to these formats gradually. Too often, scientific, civil society and economic discourses take place in isolated communities, which prevents interdisciplinary exchange and widespread public attention. Therefore, Germany’s cultural diplomacy also needs a strategic reassessment to rebuild trust and win back hearts and minds in the Arab world. Such a constructive model of communication and cooperation should be driven by realistic expectation management for conflict resolution and its limits, commitment in respectful and inclusive dialogue and exchange, and empathy for opposing positions and different argumentation lines.

In the Arab world, interlocutors are surprised and irritated that Germany, despite its economic power, does not seem to be interested or capable of increasing its involvement in the region

However, political animosities are likely to prevail. Here, Germany should better communicate and explain what drives Germany’s foreign policymaking. Still, knowledge and expertise on the complexities of Germany’s decision-making are lacking in the Arab world which oftentimes results in misunderstandings. Sometimes, the impression exists that Germany as Europe’s most important economic power almost automatically has the necessary capacities to pursue a proactive foreign and security policy. In many discussions in the Arab world, interlocutors are surprised and irritated that Germany, despite its economic power, does not seem to be interested or capable of increasing its involvement in the region due to a lack of financial and human capacities, expertise, and institutional networks. Furthermore, the historical background and multiple complexities of Germany’s close relations with Israel are hardly known in detail in the Gulf region, and has not been comprehensively communicated from the German side. As a consequence, such lack of knowledge creates mistrust on both ends. Therefore, political stakeholders, media, public pundits, and other stakeholders should find a modus operandi to discuss topics of contestation with respect and serious commitment to find concrete solutions. Playing the blame game does neither help the war victims in Gaza, nor does it result in de-escalation. In contrast, warmongers in Iran, Israel and elsewhere could benefit from such tensions. Against this backdrop, red lines should be communicated in an open and frank manner in order to manage expectations properly and prevent deconstructive whataboutism. Concrete fields of mutual cooperation are diplomatic dialogue and political exchange as well as economic collaboration. In addition, enhanced coordination of humanitarian efforts in Gaza and beyond, more cultural and people-to-people exchange and intensified efforts to introduce confidence-building measures are needed to re-build shattered trust on both sides.

Indeed, the perspectives on the Gaza war diverge from each other, but the overarching interest in regional stability features prominently on the German and the Arab side. Certainly, a sustainable and inclusive conflict solution for the Gaza war cannot be achieved with the engagement of regional powers alone as substantial contribution from Europe and the United States is needed. Here, Germany could in principle play a more important role in closer cooperation with regional players such as the Gulf monarchies, Iraq, Jordan, or Egypt. However, the more Germany is accused of ignoring Arab interests, the less the chances for constructive cooperation remain. Hence, Germany needs to precisely define its interests towards the Near and Middle East in political terms: Without the clear definition of interests there is no plan, and without clearly formulated goals, credible cooperation with the Arab world is most likely to fail. In times of regional escalation, such approach should not be considered just as an option, but rather as a priority. Otherwise, the catastrophic situation in Gaza will only deteriorate, which is neither in the interest of Germany nor of the Arab world states.

Dr Sebastian Sons is a senior researcher at the Bonn-based Centre for Applied Research with the Orient (CARPO) and an expert on the Arab Gulf states. He was awarded his PhD on labour migration from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia and is author of three books on the Arab Gulf monarchies with a particular focus on Gulf-European and Gulf-German relations.